Caroline Glick draws historical parallels to the current situation, and worries that the bureaucracy may be undermining the President’s doctrine:
THEN TOO, although Bush, like Truman, set out to form institutional tools to fight the long struggle against the forces of jihad, these institutions have done little to advance the cause. The Department of Homeland Security has not stymied the strength of Islamic agents of subversion in the US. And the National Intelligence Directorate has caused grave harm to Bush’s foremost objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In what has been cast as a bureaucratic assault on presidential power to determine US foreign policy, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran stripped Bush of the political capacity to act forthrightly to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The Defense Department’s decision last week to sack Stephen Coughlin, the only expert on Islamic law in the Pentagon’s joint staff, because his documented report on American Muslim institutional support for jihad angered pro-Muslim forces in the Pentagon, is another indication that the foreign policy bureaucracy is successfully scuttling the president’s agenda.
Most important, though, is the fact that the new centerpiece of Bush’s foreign policy agenda is to establish a Palestinian state. Bush’s support for Palestinian statehood, stated first just two months after 9/11, has always been difficult to square with his recognition of the global jihad and its radical Islamic ideology as the central challenges of our age.